Restraints on competition in the Russian air passenger market by Lukyanov, Sergey A. et al.
© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2018
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 1
134 https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu05.2018.107
UDC 338.4
Restraints on competition in  
the Russian air passenger market
S. A. Lukyanov1,2,3, L. S. Ruzhanskaya2, E. S. Avramenko2, V. V. Stroev1 
1 State University of Management, 99, Ryazansky pr., Moscow, 109542, Russian Federation
2 Ural Federal University, Graduate School of Economics and Management, 19, Mira ul., Yekaterinburg, 
620000, Russian Federation
3 St. Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation
For citation: Lukyanov S. A., Ruzhanskaya L. S., Avramenko E. S., Stroev V. V. Restraints on competi-
tion in the Russian air passenger market. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, 2018, 
vol. 34, issue 1, pp. 134–148. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu05.2018.107
This article discusses the results of a continuous study of Russian domestic air carriers con-
ducted in 2006–2016 and analyzes the main barriers to entry into the passenger air travel mar-
ket and their impact on competition in this field. There are significant structural barriers that 
prevent companies from entering this market. This situation challenges the existing concept 
and the idea of the domestic air transportation market as a quasi-competitive one. To describe 
the structure of the Russian passenger air transport market, we introduce the notion of “dis-
crete competition,” reflecting shifted density of market concentration towards small regional 
airlines. The latter are usually united by ownership mechanisms or affiliation with an airport. 
They possess considerable market power, but at the same time have an insignificant market 
share in the overall Russian passenger air market. Administrative barriers also play a crucial 
role in restraining competition. Furthermore, current institutional conditions are favourable 
for vertical ‘airport — airline’ integration which results in a fundamental transformation, as 
described by Williamson, and can be detrimental to competition. As our research findings 
have shown, there is a trade-off between existing vertically integrated structures in the air pas-
senger market and public welfare. 
Keywords: entry detergents, market structure, competition policy, discrete competition, 
antitrust regulation.
Introduction
Passenger air travel sector serves as one of the key indicators of the whole economic 
infrastructure development as the demand for air carriage reflects the population’s wel-
fare. A visible correlation between aviation development and air travel market in a coun-
try signifies economic, industrial, social, and institutional efficiency of the state policy. All 
these aspects make it especially interesting to analyse the air passenger market. 
Among the most important economic issues related to the air passenger market is 
the problem of competition and the scale of state regulation that is appropriate for this 
sphere. In the USA, the Airline Deregulation Act (1978) [Schmalensee, 1977; Douglas, 
1974; Anderson, 1984] led to positive changes and transformed the passenger air trans-
portation market into an quasi-competitive or contestable. Quasi-competitive markets are 
characterized by a relatively high concentration and small deviation of prices from the 
competitive level due to a real risk of potential competitors’ invasion. 
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Studies of the air passenger market have shown that in most Western markets there 
are clear distinctions between existing business models of passenger transportation such 
as VIP-flights, charter flights, connection flights, low cost flights etc. At the same time, 
mixed model prevail in the Russian air passenger market. In the Western countries, 
growth rates of air cargo transportation are higher than those of passenger transportation 
while the situation on the Russian market is directly opposite. 
Our study is driven by the following objective to analyse the established structure of 
the Russian air passenger market.
The paper is structured in accordance with the abovementioned objective. Firstly, 
based on the data on all the airlines currently operating in Russia, we estimated the level 
of competition and demonstrated that the market structure of the Russian air passenger 
market (APM) is not quasi-competitive at the moment in contrast to air passenger market 
of Western Europe and the USA. 
Issues of quasi-competition were also investigated in relation to large, capacious civil 
aviation markets, such as the US air transportation market [Seliverstov, 2016]. Unlike de-
veloped markets, those of emerging economies, such as Russia and the CIS countries, 
are characterized not by quasi-competition but rather by discrete competition [Lukyanov, 
Kislyak, 2007; Lukyanov, 2008; Lukyanov, Evtyukhov, 2010].
Secondly, we have identified the negative impact of vertical ‘airport — airline’ merg-
ers on competition in this market and studied the positive effects that such vertical inte-
gration has on public welfare. 
Finally, we revealed the most efficient strategies of entry into the APM to promote 
competition in this sector. 
1. Data and methodology
The main source of information on the level of competition in the APM was a data-
base of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise ‘State Air Traffic Management Corporation’ 
(further referred to as FSUE State ATM Corporation). We have analysed data on 355 Rus-
sian airlines which started their activity between 1991 and 2016. We have also used statis-
tical materials and records of the Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsyia), Transport 
Clearing House, Federal Agency of Air Transport and the Ministry of Transport of the 
Russian Federation. 
The official data were supplemented with the results of our own research which in-
cluded questionnaire-based surveys and interviews with over one hundred and fifty ex-
perts from various Russian domestic airlines. The questionnaire comprised six modules:
 — the first module asked the respondents about the market’s structure, parameters 
and characteristics of the operating airlines; 
 — the second module asked the respondents to analyse accessibility of specific 
segments in this market in terms of their openness to new players and growth 
opportunities for old ones; 
 — the third module targeted at identifying factors which prevented potential players 
from entering this market; 
 — the fourth module complemented the third one and asked the respondents to 
classify barriers as structural-technological or behavioural; 
 — the fifth module aimed at studying the types of barriers in more detail;
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 — in the sixth module, the hypothesis of overcoming the barriers described in the 
fifth module is tested. In the sixth module the respondents were asked to assess 
such forms as ‘franchising’, ‘codeshare agreements’, ‘blocked space agreements’, 
and ‘shared services agreements’. 
Thus, the first group of questions enabled us to analyse Russian APM’s structure and 
the operating companies; the second one allowed identifying the most significant barriers 
to entry; the last group of questions made us understand how these barriers are being 
overcome.
2. Competition between airlines in the Russian air passenger market
Developed economies are often considered as examples of contestable or quasi-com-
petitive markets [Baumol et al., 1982]. To what extent can the Russian air passenger market 
be characterized as contestable? According to Baumol, a contestable market is the market, 
the entrance to which is absolutely free, and the exit is absolutely costless’ [Baumol, 1982]. 
This means that entrants are not discriminated in terms of production technologies and 
quality of the product in comparison to incumbents. Long run equilibrium in contestable 
markets is characterized by the fact that companies do not receive abnormal profits; prices 
are equal to marginal costs, which is typical for perfect competition. A market of perfect 
competition is always a contestable market but not vice versa. The market’s contestability 
does not depend on its sectoral structure [Baumol, 1977]. Scale effect and effect of di-
versity can limit the number of companies to a small group of operating firms which are 
trying to minimize their expenses. However, they cannot afford to raise their prices above 
the marginal costs as otherwise this would enable a newcomer to gain an abnormal profit 
and would create stimuli for entering the market. 
This model of competition has a number of criteria which any market should meet in 
order to be classified as contestable. The authors of the contestable market concept believe 
that these criteria are as follows: 
1) free access to technologies and facilities enjoyed both by incumbent firms and 
entrants; 
2) real threat of potential competition; 
3) negligible sunk costs;
4) possibility of the ‘hit and run’ strategy (a company can enter the market and exit it 
after exhausting supernormal profits without having to bear any excessive costs).
Let us analyse whether these criteria are applicable to air travel markets, for example 
to the Russian one. 
The first criterion, that is, free access to technologies owned by operating companies 
can be met by the majority of markets, including the APM. Apart from owning a fleet, a 
company should gain access to facilities and services of its base airport and other airports 
it has to deal with. Nevertheless, in the airline sector airports and local airlines often tend 
to merge preventing other companies from opening routes to new destinations via these 
airports. 
The second criterion of a contestable market is realized by companies poaching other 
companies’ routes when the air services prices rise. This is because airlines are constantly 
looking for ways to use their capital to improve profitability. 
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The criterion of negligible sunk costs of entering the market can be met by the APM 
only with certain reservations. Sunk costs are incurred by companies and can no longer 
be recovered. Market contestability implies that sunk entry costs must be very low, almost 
insignificant. Baumol used the air passenger travel market as an example of a market with 
low sunk costs. This appears to be true at first sight. If a company has a fleet and a discrete 
flights schedule, it would not incur any extra expenses using the same fleet to open a new 
route. However, opening up new routes always leads to loss of value. For example, there 
will be costs of negotiating landing rights with an airport, fees for parking aircraft, adver-
tising expenses etc. All these cost are sunk costs, and they account for a substantial share 
of the companies’ overall costs. 
The openness criterion is met by the air passenger market to even lesser extent. It 
is expected that a potential competitor can use any opportunity of profit-making (even 
short-term ones) since it can enter the market, make profit before prices change and then 
exit the market with no sunk costs. The incumbent firms, fearing penetration of new firms, 
will keep prices at a competitive level. Thus, the market, even if it is highly concentrated, 
will demonstrate competitive pricing. 
The third and the fourth criteria are closely connected to each other: when invest-
ments are redeemable, a firm can sell its capital assets not cheaper than their market value. 
A different situation is observed if we take into account sunk costs. The higher the sunk 
costs, the longer a company has to stay in the market in order to get adequate returns and 
the less successful its ‘hit and run’ strategy can be.
In the case of charter flights, pricing depends on the number of passengers. This type 
of flights allows the intruder to operate without a substantial spend of resources. In their 
pricing policies, incumbent companies serving charter flights do not have to take into 
account new players, even if they snatch away some part of the market. A newcomer can 
realize its interests and run flights until an incumbent company starts changing its fares 
in order to push an entrant out of the market. It should be mentioned, however, that com-
panies operating within the commercial aviation sector tend to react faster to entrants’ 
pricing initiatives. 
Even this preliminary analysis of the quasi-competition concept key theoretical cri-
teria makes one doubt the fact that the Russian APM meets the necessary quality require-
ments of a contestable market. Let us describe the Russian APM’s structure on the basis of 
descriptive statistics and conduct an econometric analysis of this market. 
The Russian APM has the following characteristics. All airlines originated from ‘Aer-
oflot — Soviet Airlines’, the only national airline of the USSR. The collapse of this com-
pany resulted in emergence of 393 regional small independent companies (so-called ‘ba-
byflots’). They were either successors of the former civil aviation territorial departments 
or united aviation units. This determined their positions in the structure of an emerging 
airline market. These companies established their own route networks, base airports and 
fleets. 
In case of European countries, formation of the airline market was initially based 
on competitive struggle. Therefore, it is not surprising that foreign markets have a much 
wider range of opportunities for building contestability-based models. 
The Russian APM is rapidly changing. Since 2000, having overcome declining pas-
senger traffic volumes, it began to grow on average by 10–15 % a year (the annual GDP 
growth in Russia was 5–6 %). This period lasted till 2014 when the rates levelled off at 
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10.2 %. In the last five years, the volume of traffic has risen by more than 60 %. At the same 
time the number of carriers has been constantly decreasing (Table 1). On the one hand, 
this trend is indicative of the market expansion. On the other hand, it shows that separate 
companies are reinforcing their market positions. 
Table 1. Overall indicators of the APM development in Russia (1993–2016) 
Year Number of airlines
Number of 
certificates
Number of revoked 
certificates
Passenger traffic, million people
Total Including international airlines
1993 260 161 0 – –
1994 393 148 15 – –
1995 387 55 61 – –
1996 389 44 42 26.96 9.38
1997 362 37 64 25.10 9.12
1998 338 37 61 22.33 8.41
1999 328 26 36 21.47 7.14
2000 296 17 49 21.83 8.14
2001 267 7 36 25.07 10.04
2002 235 10 42 26.52 11.08
2003 216 5 24 29.42 12.31
2004 199 4 21 33.78 14.90
2005 182 4 21 35.09 15.89
2006 183 7 6 38.00 17.20
2007 176 5 6 42.19 18.95
2008 161 1 8 49.25 22.56
2009 153 1 21 53.12 25.19
2010 149 1 3 56.95 27.73
2011 135 3 9 64.12 31.38
2012 121 2 6 74.03 38.62
2013 119 4 7 84.56 45.33
2014 109 2 2 93.18 46.91
2015 107 4 7 92.07 37.33
2016 104 2 2 88.56 32.91
Note: The table is based on the data provided by next source: The Federal Air Transport Agency. URL: http://www.
favt.ru/dejatelnost-vozdushnye-perevozki-stat-pokazately/; http://www.favt.ru/public/materials//4/6/e/1/5/46e15e2a5e
762d0850aee65cc30ef696.pdf (accessed: 20.06.2017); Transport Clearing House. URL: https://www.tch.ru/ru-ru/Pages/
Home.aspx (accessed: 20.06.2017); The FSUE State ATM Corporation. URL: http://gkovd.ru/deyatelnost/otchety/(ac-
cessed: 20.06.2017). 
Since competition in the market is inherent, it is important to focus on the entry-exit 
processes because they influence the competition intensity in the sector. In terms of quan-
titative indicators, the market is very changeable. 
It should be noted that most of the Russian airlines are either small companies with 
just a few aircrafts for private and business flights or companies providing services for 
specific sectors of national economy. According to the FSUE State ATM Corporation, at 
the end of 2016, 104 Russian airlines were registered.
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In 2016  seven certificates commercial civil aviation operators were issued and six 
ones were revoked (Table 1). Judging by the number of issued and revoked certificates, it 
can be inferred that barriers to entry are increasing while exit is relatively easy which is 
reflected in the rising number of revoked certificates. The APM as a competitive environ-
ment has a relatively high level of concentration. For instance, with 109 operating compa-
nies, 35 are responsible for 98.7 % of the whole traffic. The five leaders (Aeroflot — Russian 
Airlines, Transaero, Siberia, Utair, and Ural Airlines) account for 62.3 % of the traffic as of 
the end of 2016. 
In equation (1) we have calculated the Herfindahl — Hirschman index measuring 
market concentration by taking into consideration equality (or inequality) of market 
shares distribution among companies. 
 HHI = Σ Si2 (1), 
where Si is the share of enterprise i (in per cent) in the overall output of the sector. The 
index value is 960.17. 
According to William Shepard’s criteria, the identified index value shows that the 
APM in Russia is a normal oligopoly with no dominating company. Concentration indi-
cators, however, being calculated at the general market level, cannot fully reflect competi-
tive environment since boundaries of markets and industries do not coincide. Basically, a 
market means transporting passengers from point A to point B (with some reservations 
about the possibility of using connection routes). In relation to the market, concentration 
indicators change dramatically, to be more precise, they rise. 
According to experts from the Antimonopoly Committee, specific problem of the air 
transportation market is presence of “pseudo competition” which hinders efficiency. Its 
existence is due to many small companies that are not able to compete because of small 
traffic volume as well as presence of a unified property or airport — airline affiliation. As 
a result, the antimonopoly authorities consider two main directions for the market struc-
ture development in the Russian air transport market. Firstly, more rational economic 
concentration in the market is required, but on condition that the market segment be-
tween airlines is not allowed on a territorial (route) or other basis. A comprehensive plan 
for civil aviation development, approved by the Chairman of the Russian Federation Gov-
ernment (No. MK-P17-08328, 12.05.01), provides for improvement of competitive rela-
tions in this sector of the economy. Secondly, selection of airports from composition of air 
enterprises can improve the market conditions. State measures aimed at restructuring and 
reforming civil aviation (Decree of the Russian Federation Government, June 24, 1998 
No. 642) also stipulate reduction in the number of airlines including their unification as 
well as separation of airlines into independent market participants  — airlines and air-
ports. It is assumed that such rationalization of the air transportation system will reduce 
high level of operating and social costs in the market increasing in this way efficiency of 
civil aviation.
Competition in the Russian APM is discrete. Discrete competition can be described 
by (1) large number of market participants in general; (2) relatively small number of par-
ticipants in separate spatial market segments with (3) high barriers to entry (into a specific 
spatial market segment).
Discrete competition in the Russian APM explained by access to specific route net-
works is impeded by low level of airport substitution for airlines as well as for customers. 
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For instance, the airline Izhavia based in Izhevsk has a share of 0.6 % in the overall volume 
of Russian passenger traffic and is not among the top thirty market leaders. On the routes 
this company serves it however plays either a dominant or a monopolistic role. This com-
pany’s share on the routes Izhevsk — Anapa, Anapa — Izhevsk, Izhevsk — St. Petersburg, 
St. Petersburg  — Izhevsk and some others is 100 %. On the route Izhevsk  — Moscow, 
Moscow — Izhevsk this company occupies a dominant position. 
Despite low values of the Herfindahl — Hirschman index, discrete character of 
competition makes the whole picture less optimistic. The discrete competition concept 
reflects a shift in market concentration towards smaller regional companies which are 
usually parts of ‘airport — airline’ mergers. These airlines have significant market power 
on the routes they serve while their market share in the overall traffic volume is small. 
Descriptive statistics and the Herfindahl — Hirschman index of the Russian APM 
demonstrate that in the modern Russian economy there are no conditions for making the 
airline market contestable. 
Let us test this assumption by applying econometric tools and surveying experts from 
Russian airlines. 
Market competition in our model is determined by four indicators: free access to 
technologies for companies; existence of real potential competition threat; negligible sunk 
entry costs; realization of ‘hit and run’ strategy by entrants. 
Our empirical study pursued two main objectives: we applied econometric methods 
to check whether the above-described independent variables can allow classifying the 
Russian APM as quasi-competitive. We applied the following econometric model to 
estimate the significance of quasi-competition in the APM: 
 Pr
 
)()1( 43210 iiiii Strategy+EntryCosts+nCompetitio+FreeEntry+FY βββββ== , (2)
Yi — is existence (1) or absence (0) of quasi-competition on the APM;
F(∙) — is function of standard normal distribution. 
Free Entry  — is expert estimation of free access to technologies (from 0  to 10, where 
0 means no access and 10 means that access is unrestricted);
Competition — is expert estimation of potential competition threat (from 0 to 10, where 
0 no potential competition threat while 10 means that the threat is maximal); 
Entry Costs — is expert estimation of sunk entry costs (from 0 to 10, where 0 means no 
sunk entry costs while 10 stands for insurmountable sunk entry costs);
Strategy — is expert estimation of the possibility of the ‘hit and run’ strategy in the airline 
market (from 0 to 10, where 0 means that this strategy can be realized by any company 
while 10 implies that this strategy cannot be realized at all). 
The research is empirically based on the results of a survey of 156 experts from the 
leading Russian and CIS airlines (apart from the Russian companies, the survey involved 
such companies as Air Astana and Skat (Kazakhstan); Air Armenia (Armenia); and Air 
Moldova (Moldova)). 
The results of regression model estimation (2) are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that all independent variables are statistically significant to classify the 
Russian APM as quasi-competitive or contestable. Therefore, compliance or non-compli-
ance with the market contestability condition for new players is a pre-requisite for estimat-
ing quasi-competition in the APM. We estimated it by the descriptive statistics analysis.
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Table 2. Estimation quasi-competition role in the APM within the framework of  
a given theoretical model
Independent variables Coefficients
Constant –0.018195 (0.624518)
Free Entry 0.013628** (5.768325)
Competition 0.103686** (4,587693)
Entry Costs 0,000318** (4.800122)
Strategy –0.018195* (–2.255429)
Pseudo R2 0,726
Number of observations 156
Note: The values of Z-statistics are given in brackets; * means that the coefficient is significant on the 5 % signifi-
cance level; ** means that the coefficient is significant on the 1% significance level. 
In order to ensure conditions for effective competition, it is important to analyze 
market barriers, especially so-called endogenous ones (i.e., internal for the market) [Pak-
homova, 2008]. 
The results of a questionnaire-based survey showed significant discrepancy between 
new and old players in terms of technology access. This discrepancy is primarily deter-
mined by lack of access to technologies experienced by newcomers. Almost all respond-
ents (94 %) pointed out that it is difficult to obtain a certificate for urgent and routine avia-
tion equipment maintenance and conducting an in-house overhaul essential for operating 
in this market. Moreover, there can be problems with specific technologies, for instance, 
with those of flight data processing and analysis. According to the Federal Air Transport 
Agency, such processing should be done for no less than 90 % of flights. Until recently, 
there were only two Russian companies with such licenses: Aeroflot — Russian Airlines 
and S7  — Siberia. Therefore, we can conclude that APM is an market with significant 
structural and technological barriers to entry.
Estimating the real threat of potential competition, it should be mentioned that since 
1990 there has been a large number of ‘entries’ (acquiring certificates). For instance, ac-
cording to the FSUE State ATM Corporation, in 2006 there were thirty-three entries out 
of which only seven managed to obtain operator’s certificates for application of aviation 
equipment. Only one company (Sky Express) can compete with existing players. All re-
spondents agreed that there are considerable administrative barriers to entry. Such barri-
ers include high transaction costs, e. g., informal payments to bureaucrats to be allowed to 
operate in a specific market, to be provided with slots (arrival / departure times), etc. High 
administrative barriers reduce potential competitors threat.
98 % of experts characterized this market as an market with a very high capital-output 
ratio. Sunk costs account for a large part of this ratio and are determined by a high degree 
of resources specificity. An essential component of sunk costs is transaction expenses (for 
example, informal payments to bureaucrats can hardly be classified as returnable). Our 
interviews with experts have provided much evidence on the Russian APM having ex-
tremely high level of sunk costs. Therefore, appearance of new airlines very “undesirable”. 
Administrative measures are much more frequently used for this purpose than economic 
competition mechanisms. Administrative barriers lead to high transaction costs.
Comparison of the cost structure of Russian and international airlines reveals 
considerable sunk costs faced by companies in the Russian airline sector. In spite of different 
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approaches to costs classification, in both cases the costs of technical, aeronautical and 
airport maintenance and lease payments account for a substantial proportion of expenses. 
According to Baumol, the ‘hit and run’ strategy in the context of airline market means 
that it is relatively easy to organize routes from point A to point B. Within the framework 
of our research, however, this strategy is seen as comparatively easy capital circulation. 
Estimating chances of entrants to realize the ‘hit and run’ strategy in the Russian APM, 
all experts pointed out that it is impossible to transfer capital from one market sector to 
another. For example, in the Russian airline market there is no airport substitution for 
companies as well as for passengers. The pre-requisite for airports substitution is their 
equal availability for passengers (that is, how easy and convenient it is for passengers to get 
from one airport to another) and opportunity to use a given airport as a base for airlines. 
The latter is determined by the airport’s class. The airport must also be certified in order 
to receive and maintain different types of aviation equipment, to serve flights to specific 
destinations, to provide the required airport maintenance of aircrafts, etc. 
In addition, another serious constraint for realization of the ‘hit and run’ strategy is 
high sunk costs determining length of stay in this market. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
chances for realizing the ‘hit and run’ strategy in the Russian airline sector are extremely 
low. 
The econometric analysis has demonstrated that all criteria of quasi-competition 
(2) are met meaning that this sector can be characterized as a quasi-competitive. How-
ever, assessment of descriptive statistics on these four independent equation variables 
(2) shows that the Russian APM does not comply with the contestability criterion. 
Our study revealed a contradiction in the use of quantitative and qualitative methods 
for analyzing markets. An attempt to formalize evaluation criteria for the use of quantita-
tive research methods, such as regression model estimation (2), led to a loss of specific 
market characteristics revealed in the course of qualitative research (expert interviews). 
As a result of descriptive analysis, we conclude that APM is characterized as a market 
with discrete competition. Thus, an important methodological conclusion is achieved: not 
all markets can be analyzed using only quantitative methods. With the APM case, it was 
shown that a combination of quantitative and qualitative research tools is needed to study 
the completeness of the market characteristics.
Theoretical and empirical analysis of this market has demonstrated that there are sig-
nificant entry barriers. The market structure is best described by using the term ‘discrete 
competition’ [Lukyanov, Kislyak, 2007; Lukyanov, 2008; Lukyanov, Evtyukhov, 2010].
Discrete competition has three main dimensions: large number of participants in 
general; relatively small number of participants in separate spatial market segments, and 
high barriers to entry (into a specific spatial market segment).
3. Ambivalent impact of vertical integration on public welfare:  
airport as a natural monopoly
According to our analysis of the Russian APM, vertical mergers ‘airport — airline’ is 
widely spread in some regions. This allows considering characteristics of a natural mo-
nopoly which is the airport itself as the core of this structure.
Airports can be classified as enterprises of infrastructural sector. Airports concen-
trate relative monopoly power in specific areas. In favourable situation, inhabitants of a 
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large urban area can have access to two airports but sometimes there is only one available 
airport. Airports’ activities cause network effects and are determined by them. Airports 
serve as central hubs of the network in which passengers can connect to other flights. Tra-
ditionally, a natural monopoly was defined based on technological approach as a firm with 
a production function demonstrating positive returns on scale regardless of its output. 
Therefore, decreasing average costs typical of all infrastructural enterprises, serve as the 
main criterion of natural monopoly. Modern technologies of aircraft landing and those 
of maintaining runway are closely connected. Application of some technologies implies 
economies of scale and diversity, which is characteristic of airports. The larger the new 
terminal, the lower the cost of passenger’s service. Thus, construction of large terminals 
provides economies of scale until the profits start to decline due to the increasing traffic. 
If one such terminal can satisfy all the demand, competitors will be left with nothing. This 
process also involves economies of diversity: the same runways can be used for transport-
ing passengers and cargo. Companies with dominant positions can offer lower prices than 
their smaller competitors. Nevertheless, in the situation of increasing economies of scale 
it may be necessary to introduce regulations in order to limit these advantages of major 
companies leading to their growing market power. Market power is used by firms to set 
excessive prices, resulting in non-optimal resource distribution. 
Modern technological organizational approach to understanding natural monopoly 
focuses on conditions for minimizing regulation of powerful companies. The theory of 
contestable markets proposed by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig had a great impact on dereg-
ulation in different sectors and on the understanding of the natural monopoly phenom-
enon. The technological organizational approach defines a situation when subadditivity of 
a costs function makes existence of one company more profitable than existence of many 
of them. Adherents of this approach consider an market to be natural monopoly if the 
costs function remains sub additive at all levels of production. In its turn, subadditivity 
means that if total production output of n firms is Q, their combined costs for the overall 
production will always be higher than the costs of one firm which has the production out-
put Q. Subadditivity can emerge due to impact of technological determinants. From the 
point of view of the contestable market theory, it results from organizational factors. In the 
situation of costs subadditivity, one large company can operate more efficiently than many 
smaller ones. Baumol used the concept of global costs subadditivity which allows describ-
ing a situation of a single-product or a multi-product natural monopoly [Baumol et al., 
1982]. An airport providing multiple services can be characterized as a multi-product 
company. Therefore, for a multi-product company costs subadditivity function will can be 
summarized as follows: 
  TC (q1,…,qm) ≤ TC1(q1) + … + TCm(qm), (3)
where TC (q1,…,qm) is the cost function describing production of a products combination; 
TCi(qi) is the cost function describing the costs of producing each product separately. 
Subadditivity means that in the case of negative returns, joint production of two 
products by one company will be a more efficient option compared to separate produc-
tion. However, M. Jamison demonstrated that global subadditivity is not sufficient but 
rather necessary requirement for a natural monopoly to exist [Jamison, 1997]. Even if 
airport services and air transportation are profitable from the public welfare point of view 
in general (multi-product subadditivity), it does not mean that from the customers’ point 
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of view the model with multiple airlines having access to the airport infrastructure would 
not be more preferable. Even if the total costs are higher, this will not necessarily im-
ply higher prices. Technological improvements can enable competing companies to offer 
their customers alternative services. In this case, competition will spread among the air-
line companies. It is much more difficult to create several competing airports at the same 
territory. Moreover, since these airports might have different specializations, the fact of 
their existence does not guarantee competition in the corresponding services market.
Transaction costs approach is based on supposition that the higher is the level of 
assets specificity, the more stimuli there are for economic agents to organize their trans-
actions in-house instead of doing so in the market. Elements of network structures in 
natural monopolies are characterized by high assets specificity, which means that these 
assets are practically impossible to apply in any other sphere. The costs of such assets are 
irreversible: they cannot be used in any other domain and they cannot be compensated 
if the firm decides to exit this market. The above-described theory is widely used for ex-
plaining vertical integration. From this standpoint, vertical integration including network 
structures is what distinguishes a natural monopoly. Therefore, the concept of natural 
monopoly is applied to vertically integrated structures. Specific assets and large invest-
ments in airports lead to situation when services are supplied by an integrated monopoly.
While in developed countries services that are not directly related to aviation bring 
up to 80 % of the profit (restaurants, hotels, trade, parking spaces, etc.), in Russia they 
account for only 20 %. The main share of companies’ funds is invested into air transpor-
tation business which leaves almost nothing for reconstruction and development of the 
company’s infrastructure. 
Attracting investors to develop ground infrastructure turns out to be a challenging 
task due to risks of inappropriate use of funds, lack of transparency in the joint aviation 
enterprise operations, necessity to merge two businesses, etc. At the same time, investors 
are primarily interested in the airport as an object of their investments. They rarely con-
sider airline companies. Therefore, one can conclude that airports have characteristics of 
a natural monopoly. 
4. Ambivalent impact of vertical integration on public welfare:  
consequences of the mergers of airports and air carriers
Vertical integration / separation of a natural monopoly and potentially competitive 
components may exert ambivalent impact on public welfare. Some economists support 
the idea of such disintegration while others are against it. Supporters put forward the 
following arguments: operations of an airport and an airline company will become more 
transparent which is extremely desirable for investment attraction; conflict between 
airline’s and airport’s targets will be eliminated. In case of disintegration, management of the 
companies will have to search for other opportunities to reduce costs and other sources of 
profit. Therefore, disintegration will create better conditions for competition. Opponents 
of disintegration provide the following argument: unity of the companies allows them to 
achieve better profitability. However, when profitability is achieved through redistribution 
of financial flows, the company loses control over efficiency of its businesses. Moreover, 
each business has to have sufficient profitability of its own. The company can set lower 
prices than its competitors. It is true that for many destinations airlines which have their 
‘own’ airports can afford to set their prices lower than competitors due to low costs. At the 
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same time, it should be taken into account that this advantage has an ambivalent nature: 
an airport subsidizes airlines but does not develop its own business. Being advantageous 
for the carrier, this can become an obstacle for the airport. Another argument for vertical 
integration is that it facilitates resolution of conflicts between participants of the air 
transportation market. However, clearly defined procedures of interaction between the 
airport and carriers can address this problem in a more efficient way. Evidence has shown 
that market mechanisms are more efficient in solving communication problems.
As our empirical observations have revealed, each year anti-monopoly authorities 
initiate about fifty proceedings for investigating evidence of restrains being put on compe-
tition in the airline market and airport operations. Most of such cases were associated with 
breaches of articles 5 and 17 of the ‘Law on Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic 
Activities in Product Markets’ [Williamson, 1985]. According to the anti-monopoly au-
thorities, specific problem of this market is ‘pseudocompetition’ which is not conducive to 
any positive results. There are two factors behind pseudocompetition: first is abundance of 
small carriers which are incapable of competing with larger companies due to their small 
traffic volumes; second is existence of vertical ‘airport — airline’ mergers. Therefore, anti-
monopoly authorities believe that there are two main directions of development of market 
infrastructure in the Russian air passenger market. 
Firstly, it is necessary to develop more rational economic concentration in the market, 
preventing market sharing among the air carriers based on the territorial (route-related) 
or any other principle. The Comprehensive Plan of Civil Aviation Development, approved 
by the Chairman of the Russian Federation Government (as of 12.05.2001 №17-083 28), 
explicitly provides for a need to stimulate competitive relationships in this sector. 
Secondly, it is essential to improve the situation in the air travel market by demerg-
ing airports from aviation enterprises. The ‘Government Measures of Restructuring and 
Reformation of Civil Aviation’ (Russian Government Decree of 24.06.1998 № 642) are also 
targeted at reducing the number of airlines. 
It is expected that these measures will rationalize the air travel structure and will re-
duce operational costs in the market as well as social costs by enhancing general efficiency 
of this sector.
The process of the Russian airline market demonopolization (disintegration of avia-
tion enterprises and separation of airports as independent businesses) started in the first 
half of the 1990s but the demonopolization rates have increased only in recent years. What 
is more, some of them underwent bankruptcy processes. The practice of breaking ver-
tically integrated ‘airport — airline’ chains and replacing them with ‘airline — efficient 
owner’ chains in the Russian context [Coase, 1937] proved to be detrimental to the route 
network, especially, to regional routes which are traditionally unprofitable and which used 
to be subsidized at the expense of more profitable ‘central’ destinations and profits from 
airport operations.
The consequences of disintegration can be described in terms of public welfare1. At 
a regional level, considering such specific criteria as mobility of labour force and other 
resources and employment rate in the market-specific market, consequences of such dis-
integration can be estimated as negative. Reductions in the route network and traffic vol-
ume lead to a considerable fall in the labour force mobility, in the accessibility of remote 
regions, and in employment of the flight staff. 
1 Although there is a new law which has recently come into force, the authors of this article rely on the 
old law since it corresponds to the period when our empirical data were gathered.
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As a result of disintegration, when new and more efficient owners replace the old 
ones, it should allegedly lead to lower passenger fares, but this is still a debatable question. 
One of the arguments in favour of disintegration is that in the ‘airport — airline’ merger 
customers have to pay monopoly prices which is a negative effect (in the terms of public 
welfare it is the customer’s loss). This situation is theoretically possible. 
However, when large and efficient airlines occupy vacant places left after the collapse 
of the vertical ‘airport — airline’ merger, they tend to push smaller and less competitive 
companies out of the market which leads to increasing concentration and possible growth 
in passenger tariffs.
Disintegration of an ‘airport — airline’ merger does not provide any explicitly posi-
tive effect. An inefficient company from a vertically organized ‘airport — airline’ structure 
is replaced by an efficient company with market power. As a result, the latter occupies 
a monopolistic position, which in turn influences new ‘monopoly’ power. This causes a 
severe reduction in the route network, unemployment among the flight staff of the com-
pany which left the sector, and reduced accessibility of airlines resulting in growing social 
tension. 
Another impactful factor preventing efficient separation of vertically integrated ‘air-
port — airline’ structures and efficient operation of players in this market is the low level 
of airports substitution for companies as well as for passengers. Recently, the aerodrome 
network serving local airlines has shrunk almost six times, a number of aerodromes and 
airlines which connected Russian regions to the country’s central part were closed alto-
gether. As a result, over twelve million people do not have all-year access to air transporta-
tion. According to the Federal Air Transport Agency, the number of aerodromes in Russia 
dropped from 1,302 in 1992 to 352 in 2016 [Federal Air Transport Agency…]. Technical 
and technological levels of aerodromes ground equipment also leaves much to be desired. 
Only 59 % of aerodromes have improved runways. 70 % of aerodromes were built 
over twenty years ago and most of them are in need for reconstruction. In the Russian 
Federation there are only sixty-two airports which have federal status and form the core 
network of the Russian civil aviation [Federal Air Transport Agency…]. Substitution of 
airports allows airlines to reallocate their resources more effectively and to optimize both 
passenger and cargo traffic, which is one of the most essential prerequisites for meeting 
such quasi-competition criterion as the possibility of realizing the ‘hit and run’ strategy. 
Conclusion
Based on the results of the Russian domestic carriers study conducted in 2006–2014, 
the article describes the structure of the Russian air passenger market and its key charac-
teristics as a quasi-competitive market. The authors also analysed impact of disintegration 
of vertically integrated ‘airport — airline’ structures on the regional public welfare. Econo-
metric methods were used to estimate the strategies of overcoming the entry barriers. 
Our findings indicate that there are significant structural, technological and behavioural 
market-specific barriers to entry into the Russian air passenger market which makes us 
doubt the existence of quasi-competition in this sector. Our empirical study of entry bar-
riers has shown that in the Russian air passenger market administrative barriers are the 
most considerable factor impeding competition.
Discrete competition describes the Russian air passenger market because the market 
is dominated by small regional companies. These companies tend to be a part of a verti-
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cally integrated ‘airport — airline’ entity, they are monopolists on certain routes, but they 
occupy a small fraction of the total volume of passenger transportation. 
We found in the regional markets the merger of airlines and home airports, which 
leads to additional monopolization. Our analysis showed that the relationship between 
such vertically integrated structures and public welfare is ambivalent. Firstly, disruption of 
vertical mergers often leads to a new ‘efficient’ monopoly dominating the market and us-
ing monopoly price formation. Secondly, disintegration of vertical structures often results 
in such negative effects as a considerable decrease in the passenger flow and in the labor 
force mobility; growing unemployment in the air travel market. 
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В данной статье рассматриваются результаты анализа структуры отечественных авиа-
перевозчиков, который проводился с 2006 по 2016 г., а также анализируются основные 
барьеры для входа на рынок пассажирских авиаперевозок и их влияние на конкурен-
цию на этом рынке. Делается вывод о том, что существуют значительные технологиче-
ские и поведенческие барьеры, которые являются существенными препятствиями для 
входа новых компаний на рынок. Эта ситуация бросает вызов существующей концеп-
ции и представлению об отечественном рынке авиаперевозок как квазиконкурентно-
му рынку. Для описания структуры российского рынка пассажирских авиаперевозок 
мы вводим понятие дискретной конкуренции, отражающее смещенную плотность 
концентрации рынка в  сторону небольших региональных авиакомпаний. Последние 
обычно объединяются механизмами собственности или принадлежностью к аэропор-
ту. Они обладают значительной рыночной властью, но в то же время имеют незначи-
тельную долю на рынке российского пассажирского авиаперевозок. Было обнаружено, 
что административные барьеры играют решающую роль в сдерживании конкуренции. 
Кроме того, нынешние институциональные условия благоприятны для вертикальной 
интеграции «аэропорт — авиакомпания», что приводит к фундаментальной трансфор-
мации, как описано Уильямсоном, и может нанести ущерб конкуренции. Как показали 
наши результаты исследований, существует компромисс между вертикально интегри-
рованными структурами на рынке пассажирских авиаперевозок и общественным бла-
госостоянием.
Ключевые слова: входные барьеры, структура рынка, дискретная конкуренция, 
конкурентная политика, антимонопольное регулирование.
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